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Abstract—One of the most important aspects of security 
organization is to establish a framework to identify security-
significant points where policies and procedures are declared. 
The (information) security infrastructure comprises entities, 
processes, and technology. All are participants in handling 
information, which is the item that needs to be protected. Privacy 
and security information technology is a critical and unmet need 
in the management of personal information. This paper proposes 
concepts and technologies for management of personal 
information. Two different types of information can be 
distinguished: personal information and non-personal 
information. Personal information can be either personal-
identifiable information (PII), or non-identifiable information 
(NII). Security, policy, and technical requirements can be based 
on this distinction. At the conceptual level, PII is defined and 
formalized by propositions over infons (discrete pieces of 
information) that specify transformations in PII and NII. PII is 
categorized into simple infons that reflect the proprietor’s 
aspects, relationships with objects, and relationships with other 
proprietors. The proprietor is the identified person about whom 
the information is communicated. The paper proposes a database 
organization that focuses on the PII spheres of proprietors. At the 
design level, the paper describes databases of personal 
identifiable information built exclusively for this type of 
information, with their own conceptual scheme, system 
management, and physical structure. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Rapid advances in information technology and the 
emergence of privacy-invasive technologies have made 
information privacy a critical issue. According to Bennett and 
Raab [11], technically, the concept of information privacy is 
treated as information security. “Information privacy is the 
interest an individual has in controlling, or at least significantly 
influencing, the handling of data about themselves” [10]; 
however, the information privacy domain goes beyond security 
concerns.  
Information security aims to ensure the security of all 
information regardless whether privacy related or non-privacy 
related. Here we use the term information in its ordinary sense 
of “facts” stored in a database. This paper explores the privacy-
related differences between types of information to argue that 
security, policy, and technical requirements set personal 
identifiable information apart from other types of information, 
leading to the need for a PII database with its own conceptual 
scheme, system management, and physical structure. 
Different types of information of interest in this paper are 
shown in Fig. 1. We will use the term infon to refer to “a piece 
of information” [9]. The parameters of an infon are objects, 
and so-called anchors assign these objects such as agents to 
parameters. Infons can have sub-infons that are also infons.  
Let INF = the set of infons in the system. Four types of 
infons are identified: 
1. So-called “private or personal” information is a 
subset of INF. “Private or personal” information is 
partitioned into two types of information: PII and 
PNI. 
2. PII is the set of pieces of personal identifiable 
information. We use the term pinfon to refer to this 
special type of infon. The relationship between PII 
and the notion of identifiably will be discussed later. 
3. PNI is the set of pieces of non-identifiable 
information.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. NII = (INF – PII). We use the term ninfon to refer to 
this special type of infon. NII is the set of pieces of 
Private/personal information 
 
Personal non-identifiable 
information (PNI) 
 
Information (INF) 
 
Personal identifiable 
information (PII) 
 
Figure 1.  Types of information. 
11 http://sites.google.com/site/ijcsis/ 
ISSN 1947-5500
(IJCSIS) International Journal of Computer Science and Information Security,  
Vol. 5, No. 1, 2009 
non-identifiable information and includes all pieces 
of information except personal identifiable 
information (shaded area in Fig. 1). PNI in Fig. 1 is a 
subset of NII. It is the set of non-identifiable 
information; however, it is called “personal” or 
“private” because its owner (a natural person) has 
interest in keeping it private. In contrast, PII embeds 
a unique identity of a natural person 
From the security point of view, PII is more sensitive than 
an “equal amount” (to be discussed later) of NII. With regard 
to policy, PII has more policy-oriented significance (e.g., the 
1996 EU directive) than NII. With regard to technology, there 
are unique PII-related technologies (e.g., P3P) and techniques 
(e.g., k-anonymization) that revolve around PII. Additionally, 
PII possesses an objective definition that allows separating it 
from other types of information, which facilitates organizing it 
in a manner not available to NII information. 
The distinction of infons into PII, NII, and PNI requires a 
supporting technology. We thus need a framework that allows 
us to handle, implement, and manage PII, NII, and PNI. 
Management of PII, NII, and PNI ought, ideally, to be optimal 
in the sense that derivable infons are not stored. This paper 
introduces a formalism to specify privacy-related infons based 
on a theoretical foundation. Current privacy research lacks 
such formalism. The new formalism can benefit two areas. 
First, a precise definition of the informational privacy notion is 
introduced. It can also be used as a base to develop a formal 
and informal specification language. Informal specification 
language can be used as a vehicle to specify various privacy 
constraints and rules. Further work can develop a full formal 
language to be used in privacy enhancing systems.  
In this paper, we concentrate on the conceptual 
organization of PII databases based on a theory of infons. To 
achieve such a task, we need to identify which subset of infons 
will be considered personal identifiable information. Since the 
combination of personal identifiable information is also 
personally identifiable, we must find a way to minimize the 
information to be stored. We introduce an algebra that supports 
such minimization.  Infons may belong to different users in a 
system. We distinguish between proprietors (persons to whom 
PII refers through embedded identities) and owners (entities 
that possess PII of others such as agencies or other non-
proprietor persons). 
II. RELATED WORKS 
Current database management systems (DBMS) do not 
distinguish between PII and NII. An enterprise typically has 
one or several databases. Some data is “private,” other data is 
public, and it is typical that these data are combined in queries. 
“Private” typically means exclusive ownership of and rights 
(e.g., access) to the involved data, but there is a difference 
between “private” data and personal identifiable data. “Private” 
data may include NII exclusively controlled by its owner; in 
contrast, PII databases contain only personal identifiable 
information and related data, as will be described later. For 
example, in the Oracle database, the Virtual Private Database 
(VPD) is the aggregation of fine-grained access control in a 
secure application context. It provides a mechanism for 
building applications that enforce the security policies 
customers want enforced, but only where such control is 
necessary. By dynamically appending a predicate to SQL 
statements, VPD limits access to data at the table’s row level 
and ties the security policy to the table (or view) itself. 
“Private” in VPD means data owned and controlled by its 
owner. Such a mechanism supports the “privacy” of any owned 
data, not necessarily personal identifiable information. In 
contrast, we propose to develop a general PII information 
database management system where PII and NII are explicitly 
separated in planning, design, and implementation.  
Separating “private” data from “public” data has already 
been adopted in privacy preserving systems; however, these 
systems do not distinguish explicitly personal identifiable 
information. The Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) is one 
such system that provides a means for privacy policy 
specification and exchange but “does not provide any 
mechanism to ensure that these promises are consistent with 
the internal data processing” [7]. It is our judgment that 
“internal data processing” requires recognizing explicitly that 
“private data” is of two types: personal identifiable information 
and personal non-identifiable information, and this difficulty is 
caused by the heterogeneity of data. Hippocratic databases 
have been introduced as systems that integrate privacy 
protection into relational database systems [1][4]. A 
Hippocratic database includes privacy policies and 
authorizations associated with each attribute and each user for 
usage purpose(s). Access is granted if the access purpose 
(stated by the user) is entailed by the allowed purposes and not 
entailed by the prohibited purposes [7]. Users’ role hierarchies, 
similar to ones used in security policies (e.g., RBAC), are used 
to simplify management of the mapping between users and 
purposes. A request to access data is accompanied by access 
purpose, and accessing permission is determined after 
comparing such purpose with the intended purposes of that data 
in privacy policies. Each user has authorization for a set of 
access purposes. Nevertheless, in principle, a Hippocratic 
database is a general DBMS with a purpose mechanism. 
Purposes can be declared for any data item that is not 
necessarily personal identifiable information. 
III. INFONS 
This section reviews the theory of infons. The theory of 
infons provides a rich algebra of construction operations that 
can be applied to PII.  Infons in an application domain such as 
personal identifiable information are typically interrelated; they 
partially depend on each other, partially exclude each other, 
and may be (hierarchically) ordered. Thus we need a theory 
that allows constructing a “lattice” of infons (and PII infons) 
that includes basic and complex infons while taking into 
consideration their structures and relationships. In such a 
theory, we identify basic infons that cannot be decomposed into 
more basic infons. This construction mechanism of infons from 
infons should be supported by an algebra of construction 
operations. We generally may assume that each infon consists 
of a number of components. The construction is applied in 
performing combination, replacement, or removal of some of 
these components; some may be essential (not removable) or 
auxiliary (optional). 
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An infon is a discrete item of information and may be 
parametric and anchored. The parameters represent objects or 
properties of objects. Anchors assign objects to parameters. 
Parameter-value pairs are used to represent a property of an 
infon. The property may be valid, invalid, undetermined, etc. 
The validity of properties is typically important information.   
Infons are thus representable by a tuple structure 
 <<ID, {(param, value, validity)} >>  
or by an anchored tuple structures  
    <<ID, {((param, value, validity), anchor(object))} >>.  
We may order properties and anchors. A linear order allows 
representing an infon as a simple predicate value. Following 
Devin’s formalism [9], an infon has the form <<R, a1, ... , an, 
1>> and <<R, a1, ... , an, 0>>. R is an n-place relation and a1, . 
. . , an are objects appropriate for R. 0 and 1 indicate these may 
be thought of as objects do, do not, respectively, and they stand 
in relation R. For simplicity sake, we may write an infon <<R, 
a1, ... , an, 1/0>> as <<a1, ... , an>> when R is known or 
immaterial.  
We may use multisets instead of sets for infons or a more 
complex structure. We choose the set notation because of its 
representability within the XML technology.  Sets allow us to 
introduce a simple algebra and a simple set of predicates.   
“PII infons” are distinguished by the mandatory presence of 
at least one proprietor, an object of type uniquely identifiable 
person.  
The world of infons currently of interest can be specified as 
the triple: (A; O; P) as follows. 
-  Atomic infons A 
- Algebraic operations O for computing complex infons such 
as combination ⊕ of infons, abstraction ⊗ of infons by 
projections, quotient ÷ of infons, ρ renaming of infons, union 
∪ of infons, intersection ∩ of infons, full negation ¬ of infons, 
and minimal negation ┐ of infons within a given context. 
-  Predicates P stating associations among infons such as the 
sub-infon relation, a statement whether infons can be 
potentially associated with each other, a statement whether 
infons cannot be potentially associated with each other, a 
statement whether infons are potentially compatible with each 
other, and a statement whether infons are incompatible with 
each other. 
The combination of two infons results in an infon with all 
components of the two infons. The abstraction is used for a 
reduction of components of an infon. The quotient allows 
concentrating on those components that do not appear in the 
second infon. The union takes all components of two infons 
and does not combine common components into one 
component. The full negation allows generating all those 
components that do not appear in the infon. The minimal 
negation restricts this negation to some given context. 
We require that the sub-infon relation is not transitively 
reflexive. The compatibility and incompatibility predicates are 
not contradictory. The potential association and its negation 
must not conflict. The predicates should not span all possible 
associations among the infons but only those that are 
meaningful in a given application area. We may assume that 
two infons are either potentially associated or cannot be 
associated with each other. The same restriction can be made 
for compatibility.  
This infon world is very general and allows deriving more 
advanced operations and predicates. If we assume the 
completeness of compatibility and association predicates, we 
may use expressions defined by the operations and derived 
predicates. The extraction of application-relevant infons from 
infons is supported by five operations:  
1. Infon projection narrows the infon to those parts (objects or 
concepts, axioms or invariants relating entities, functions, 
events, and behaviors) of concern for the application-relevant 
infons. For example, a projection operation may produce the 
set of proprietors from a given infon, e.g., {Mary, John} from 
John loves Mary.  
2. Infon instantiation lifts the general infons to those of 
interest within the solution and instantiates variables by values 
that are fixed for the given system. For example a PII infon 
may be instantiated from its anonymized version, e.g., John is 
sick from Someone is sick.  
3. Infon determination is used to select those traces or 
solutions to the problem under inspection that are the most 
suitable or the best fit for the system envisioned. The 
determination typically results in a small number of scenarios 
for the infons to be supported, for example, infon 
determination to decide whether an infon belongs to a certain 
piiSphere (PII of a certain proprietor – to be discussed later).  
4. Infon extension is used to add those facets not given by the 
infon but by the environment or the platforms that might be 
chosen or that might be used for simplification or support of 
the infon (e.g., additional data, auxiliary functionality), for 
example, infon extension to related non-identifiable 
information (to be discussed later).  
5. Infons are often associated, adjacent, interacting, or fit with 
each other. Infon join is used to combine infons into more 
complex and combined infons that describe a complex 
solution, for example, joining atomic PIIs to form compound 
PII (these types of PII will be defined later) and a collection of 
related PII information.  
The application of these operations allows extraction of 
which sub-infons, which functionality, which events, and 
which behavior (e.g., the action/verb in PII) are shared among 
information spheres (e.g., of proprietors). These shared 
“facilities” encompass all information spheres of relevant 
infons. They also hint at possible architectures of information 
and database systems and at separation into candidate 
components. For instance, entity sharing (say, non-person 
entity) describes which information flow and development can 
be observed in the information spheres. 
We will not be strictly formal in applying infon theory to 
PII. Such a venture needs far more space. Additionally, we 
squeeze the approach in the area of database design in order to 
illustrate a sample application. The theory of PII infons can be 
applied in several areas, including the technical and legal 
aspects of information privacy and security. 
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IV. PERSONAL IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION  
It is typically claimed that what makes data “private” or 
“personal” is either specific legislation, e.g., a company must 
not disclose information about its employees, or individual 
agreements, e.g., a customer has agreed to an electronic 
retailer's privacy policy. However, this line of thought blurs the 
difference between personal identifiable information and other 
“private” or “personal” information. Personal identifiable 
information has an “objective” definition in the sense that it is 
independent of such authorities as legislation or agreement.  
PII infons involve a special relationship called 
proprietorship with their proprietors, but not with persons who 
are their non-proprietors, and non-persons such as institutions, 
agencies, or companies. For example, a person may possess 
PII of another person, or a company may have the PII of 
someone in its database; however, proprietorship of PII is 
reserved only to its proprietor regardless of who possesses it. 
To base personal identifiable information on firmer 
ground, we turn to stating some principles related to such 
information. For us, personal identifiable information (pinfon) 
is any information that has referent(s) to uniquely identifiable 
persons [2]. In logic, this type of reference is the relation of a 
word (logical name) to a thing.  
A pinfon is an infon such that at least one of the “objects” 
is a singly identifiable person. Any singly identifiable person 
in the pinfon is called proprietor of that pinfon. The proprietor 
is the person about whom the pinfon communicates 
information. If there is exactly one object of this type, the 
pinfon is an atomic pinfon; if there is more than one singly 
identifiable person, it is a compound pinfon. An atomic pinfon 
is a discrete piece of information about a singly identifiable 
person. A compound pinfon is a discrete piece of information 
about several singly identifiable persons. If the infon does not 
include a singly identifiable person, it is called a ninfon. 
We now introduce a series of axioms that establish the 
foundation of the theory of personal identifiable information. 
These axioms can be considered negotiable assumptions. The 
symbol “→” denotes implication. INF is the set of infons 
described in Fig. 1. 
1.  Inclusivity of INF 
σ ∈ INF ↔ σ ∈ PII ∨ σ ∈ NII 
That is, infons are the union of pinfons and ninfons. PII is the 
set of pinfons (pieces of personal identifiable information), 
and NII is the set of ninfons (pieces of non-identifiable 
information).  
2.  Exclusivity of PII and NII 
σ ∈ INF ∧ σ ∉ PII → σ ∈ N 
σ ∈ INF ∧ σ ∉ N → σ ∈ PII 
That is, every infon is exclusively either pinfon or ninfon. 
3. Identifiability 
Let ID denote the set of (basic) pinfons of type  
<< is, Þ, 1>> and let þ be a parameter for a singly identifiable 
person.  
Then << is, Þ, 1>>  → << is, Þ, 1>>  ∈ INF 
4. Inclusivity of PII  
Let nσ denote the number of uniquely identified persons in the 
infon σ, then σ ∈ INF ∧ nσ > 0 ↔ σ ∈ PII 
5. Proprietary 
For σ ∈ PII, let PROP(σ) be the set of proprietors of σ. Let 
PERSONS denote the set of (natural) persons. Then,  
σ ∈ PII → PROP(σ) ∈ PERSONS 
That is, pinfons are pieces of information about persons. 
6. Inclusivity of NII   
σ ∈ INF ∧ (nσ = 0) ↔ σ ∈ NII 
That is, non-identifiable information (ninfon) does not embed 
any unique identifiers of persons. 
7.  Combination of non-identifiability with identity 
Let ID denote the set of (basic) pinfons of type:  
<< is, Þ, 1>>, then, 
σ1 ∈ PII ↔ <<σ2 ∈ NII ⊕ σ3 ∈ ID) >>  
assuming σ1 ∉ ID. “⊕” here denotes the “merging” of two 
sub-infons. 
8. Closability of PII  
σ1 ∈ PII ⊕ σ2 ∈ PII → (σ1 ⊕ σ2) ∈ PII 
9.  Combination with non-identifiability 
σ1 ∈ NII ⊕σ2 ∈ PII → (σ1⊕σ2) ∈ PII 
That is, non-identifying information plus personal identifiable 
information is personal identifiable information. 
10. Reducibility to non-identifiability 
σ1 ∈ PII ÷ (σ2 ∈ ID) ↔ σ3 ∈ NII  
where σ2 is a sub-infon of σ1. “÷” denotes removing σ2. 
11.  Atomicity 
Let APII = the set of atomic personal identifiable information. 
Then, σ ∈ PII ∧ (nσ = 1) ↔ σ ∈ APII 
12. Non-atomicity 
Let CPII = the set of compound personal identifiable 
information. Then, σ ∈ PII ∧ (nσ > 1) ↔ σ ∈ CPII 
13.  Reducibility to atomicity 
σ ∈ CPII ↔ <<σ1,  σ2, …, σm >>,  σi ∈ APII, 
m = nσ, and 1≤i≤ m, and {PROP(σ1) , PROP(σ2), …, 
PROP(σm)} = PROP(σ).  
These axioms support the separation of infons into PII, NII, 
and PNI and their transformation. Let us now discuss the 
impact of some of these axioms. We concentrate the 
discussion on the more difficult axioms. 
Identifiability 
Let þ be a parameter for a singly identifiable person, i.e., a 
specific person, defined as 
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Þ = IND1|<< singly identifiable, IND1, 1>> 
where IND indicates the basic type: an individual [9].  
That is, Þ is a (restricted) parameter with an anchor for an 
object of type singly identifiable individual. The individual 
IND1 is of type person defined as 
<< person, IND1, 1>> 
Put simply, þ is a reference to a singly identifiable person. We 
now elaborate on the meaning of “identifiable.”  
Consider the set of unique identifiers of persons. 
Ontologically, the Aristotelian entity/object is a single, 
specific existence (a particularity) in the world. For us, the 
identity of an entity is its natural descriptors (e.g., tall, black 
eyes, male, blood type A, etc.). These descriptors exist in the 
entity/object. Tallness, whiteness, location, etc. exist as 
aspects of the existence of the entity. We recognize the human 
entity from its natural descriptors. Some descriptors form 
identifiers. A natural identifier is a set of natural descriptors 
that facilitates recognizing a person uniquely. Examples of 
identifiers include fingerprints, faces, and DNA. No two 
persons have identical natural identifiers. An artificial 
descriptor is a descriptor that is mapped to a natural identifier. 
Attaching the number 123456 to a particular person is an 
example of an artificial descriptor in the sense that it is not 
recognizable in the (natural) person. An artificial identifier is a 
set of descriptors mapped to a natural identifier of a person. 
Date of birth (an artificial descriptor), gender (a natural 
descriptor), and a 5-digit ZIP (an artificial descriptor) are three 
descriptors that form an artificial identifier for 87% of the US 
population [12]. By implication, no two persons have identical 
artificial identifiers. If two persons somehow have the same 
Social Security number, then this Social Security number is 
not an artificial identifier because it is not mapped uniquely to 
a natural identifier. 
We define identifiers of proprietors as infons. Such 
definition is reasonable since the mere act of identifying a 
proprietor is a reference to a unique entity in the information 
sphere.  Hence, 
<< is, Þ, 1>>  → << is, Þ, 1>>  ∈ INF 
That is, every unique identifier of a person is an infon. These 
infons cannot be decomposed into more basic infons. 
Inclusivity of PII  
Next we position identifiers as the basic infons in the 
sphere of PII. The symbol nσ denotes the number of uniquely 
identified persons in infon σ. Then we can define PII and NII 
accordingly: 
σ ∈ INF ∧ nσ > 0 ↔ σ ∈ PII 
That is, an infon that includes unique identifiers of (natural) 
persons is personal identifiable information. From (3) and (4), 
any unique personal identifier or piece of information that 
embeds identifiers is personal identifiable information. Thus, 
identifiers are the basic PII infons (pinfons) that cannot be 
decomposed into more basic infons. Furthermore, every 
complex pinfon includes in its structure at least one basic 
infon, i.e., identifier. The structure of a complex pinfon is 
constructed from several components: 
- Basic pinfons and ninfons, i.e., the pinfon John S. Smith and 
the ninfon Someone is sick form the atomic PII (i.e., PII with 
one proprietor) John S. Smith is sick. This pinfon is produced 
by an instantiation operation that lifts the general infons to 
pinfons and instantiates the variable (Someone) by a value 
(John S. Smith). 
- Complex pinfons form more complex infons, e.g., John S. 
Smith and Mary F. Fox are sick 
We notice that the operation of projection is not PII-closed 
since we can define projecting of ninfon from pinfon 
(removing all identifiers). This operation is typically called 
anonymization.  
Every pinfon refers to its proprietor(s) in the sense that it 
“leads” to him/her/them as distinguishable entities in the 
world. This reference is based on his/her/their unique 
identifier(s). As stated previously, the relationship between 
persons and their own pinfon is called proprietorship [1]. A 
pinfon is proprietary PII of its proprietor(s). 
Defining pinfon as “information identifiable to the 
individual” does not mean that the information is “especially 
sensitive, private, or embarrassing. Rather, it describes a 
relationship between the information and a person, namely 
that the information—whether sensitive or trivial—is 
somehow identifiable to an individual” [10]. However, 
personal identifiable information (pinfon) is more “valuable” 
than personal non-identifiable information (ninfon) because it 
has an intrinsic value as “a human matter,” just as privacy is a 
human trait. Does this mean that scientific information about 
how to make a nuclear bomb has less intrinsic moral value 
than the pinfon John is left handed? No, it means John is left 
handed has a higher moral value than the ninfon There exists 
someone who is left handed. It is important to compare equal 
amounts of information when we decide the status of each 
type of information [5]. 
To exclude such notions as confidentiality being 
applicable to the informational privacy of non-natural persons 
(e.g., companies), the next axiom formalizes that pinfon is 
applied only to (natural) persons.  
For σ ∈ PII, we define PROP(σ) to be the set of proprietors of 
σ. Notice that |PROP(σ ∈ PII)| = nσ. Multiple occurrences of 
identifiers of the same proprietor are counted as a single 
reference to the proprietor. In our ontology, we categorize 
things (in the world) as objects (denoted by the set OBJECTS) 
and non-objects. Objects are divided into (natural) persons 
(denoted by the set PERSONS) and non-persons. A 
fundamental proposition in our system is that proprietors are 
(natural) persons. 
Combination of non-identifiability with identity 
Next we can specify several transformation rules that 
convert from one type of information to another. These 
(privacy) rules are important for deciding what type of 
information applies to what operations (e.g., information 
disclosure rules).  
Let ID denote the set of (basic) pinfons of type << is, Þ, 
1>>. That is, ID is the set of identifiers of persons (in the 
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world). We now define construction of complex infons from 
basic pinfons and non-identifying information. The definition 
also applies to projecting pinfons from more complex pinfons 
by removing all or some non-identifying information. 
σ1 ∈ PII ↔ <<σ2 ∈ NII ⊕ σ3 ∈ ID) >> 
assuming σ1 ∉ ID. 
That is, non-identifiable information plus a unique personal 
identifier is personal identifiable information and vice versa 
(i.e., minus). Thus the set of pinfons is closed under operations 
that remove or add non-identifying information. We assume 
the empty information ∅ is in NII. “⊕” here denotes 
“merging” two sub-infons. We also assume that only a single 
σ3 ∈ ID is added to σ2 ∈ NII; however, the axiom can be 
generalized to apply to multiple identifiers. An example of 
axiom 7 is 
σ1 = << John loves apples>> ↔  <<σ2 = Someone loves apples 
⊕ σ3 = John>> 
Or, in a simpler description: σ1 = John loves apples ↔  {σ2 = 
Someone loves apples ⊕ σ3 = John} 
The axiom can also be applied to the union ∪ of pinfons. 
Closability of PII  
PII is a closed set under different operations (e.g., merge, 
concatenate, submerge, etc.) that construct complex pinfons 
from more basic pinfons. Hence,  
σ1 ∈ PII ⊕ σ2 ∈ PII → (σ1 ⊕ σ2) ∈ PII 
That is, merging personal identifiable information with 
personal identifiable information produces personal 
identifiable information. In addition, PII is a closed set under 
different operations (e.g., merge, concatenate, submerge, etc.) 
that construct complex pinfons by mixing pinfons with non-
identifying information.   
Reducibility to non-identifiability 
Identifiers are the basic pinfons. Removing all identifiers 
from a pinfon converts it to non-identifying information. 
Adding identifiers to any piece of non-identifying information 
converts it to a pinfon, 
σ1 ∈ PII ÷ σ2 ∈ ID ↔ σ3 ∈ NII 
where σ2 is a sub-infon of σ1.  
Axiom 10 states that personal identifiable information minus a 
unique personal identifier is non-identifying information and 
vice versa. “÷” here denotes removing σ2. We assume that a 
single σ2 ∈ ID is embedded in σ1; however, the opposition can 
be generalized to apply to multiple identifiers such that 
removing all identifiers produces σ3 ∈ NII. 
Atomicity  
Furthermore, we define atomic and non-atomic 
(compound) types of pinfons. Let  
APII = a set of atomic personal identifiable information. 
Each piece of atomic personal identifiable information is a 
special type of pinfon called apinfon.  
As we will see later, cpinfons can be reduced to apinfons, thus 
simplifying the analysis of PII. Formally, the set APII is 
defined as follows.  σ ∈ PII ∧ nσ = 1 ↔ σ ∈ APII 
That is, an apinfon is a pinfon with a single human referent. 
Notice that σ may embed several identifiers of the same 
person, yet the referent is still one. Notice that apinfons can be 
basic (a single identifier) or complex (a single identifier plus 
non-identifiable information). 
Non-atomicity 
Let CPII = a set of compound personal identifiable 
information. Each piece of compound personal identifiable 
information is a special type of pinfon called cpinfon. 
Formally, the set CPII is defined as follows. 
 σ ∈ PII ∧ nσ > 1 ↔ σ ∈ CPII 
That is, a cpinfon is a pinfon with more than one human 
referent. Notice that cpinfons are always complex since they 
must have at least two apinfons (two identifiers). 
The apinfon (atomic personal identifiable information) is the 
“unit” of personal identifiable information. It includes one 
identifier and non-identifiable information. We assume that at 
least some of the non-identifiable information is about the 
proprietor. In theory this is not necessary. Suppose that an 
identifier is amended to a random piece of non-identifiable 
information (noise). In the PII theory the result is (complex) 
atomic PII. In general, mixing noise with information 
preserves information. 
Reducibility to atomicity 
Any cpinfon is privacy-reducible to a set of apinfons 
(atomic personal identifiable information). For example, John 
and Mary are in love can be privacy-reducible to the apinfons 
John and someone are in love and Someone and Mary are in 
love. Notice that our PII theory is a syntax (structural) based 
theory. It is obvious that the privacy-reducibility of compound 
personal identifiable information causes a loss of “semantic 
equivalence,” since the identities of the referents in the 
original information are separated. Semantic equivalency here 
means preserving the totality of information, the pieces of 
atomic information, and their link.  
Privacy reducibility is expressed by the following axiom:  
σ ∈ CPII ↔ <<σ1,  σ2, …, σm >>,  σi ∈ APII, 
m = nσ, (1 ≤ i ≤ m), and {PROP(σ1) , PROP(σ2), …, 
PROP(σm)} = PROP(σ).  
The reduction process produces m atomic personal 
identifiable information with m different proprietors. Notice 
that the set of resultant apinfons produces a compound pinfon. 
This preserves the totality of the original cpinfon through 
linking its apinfons together as members of the same set. 
V. CATEGORIZATION OF ATOMIC PERSONAL IDENTIFIABLE 
INFORMATION 
In this section, we identify categories of apinfons. Atomic 
personal identifiable information provides a foundation for 
structuring pinfons since compound personal identifiable 
information can be reduced to a set of apinfons. We 
concentrate on reducing all given personal identifiable 
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information to sets of apinfons. Justification for this will be 
discussed later.  
A. Eliminating ninfons embedded in an apinfon 
Organizing a database of personal identifiable information 
requires filtering and simplifying apinfons to more basic 
apinfons in order to make the structuring of pinfons easier. 
Axiom (9) tells us that pinfons may carry non-identifiable 
information, ninfons. This non-identifiable information may 
be random noise or information not directly about the 
proprietor. Removing random noise is certainly an advantage 
in designing a database. Identifying information that is not 
about the proprietor clarifies the boundary between PII and 
NII. 
A first concern when analyzing an apinfon is projecting 
(isolating, factoring) information about any other entities 
besides the proprietor. Consider the apinfon John’s car is fast. 
This is information about John and about a car of his. This 
apinfon can be projected as: 
⊗ (John’s car is fast) ⇒ {The car is fast, John has a car}, 
where ⇒ is a production operator. 
John’s car is fast information embeds the “pure” apinfon John 
has a car and the ninfon The car is fast. John has a car is 
information about a relationship that John has with another 
object in the world. This last information is an example of 
what we call self information. Self information (sapinfon = 
self atomic pinfon) is information about a proprietor, his/her 
aspects (e.g., tall, short), or his/her relationship with non-
human objects in the world; it is thus useful to further reduce 
apinfons (atomic) to sapinfon (self). 
Sapinfon is related to the concept of “what the piece of 
apinfon is about.” In the theory of aboutness, this question is 
answered by studying the text structure and assumptions of the 
source about the receiver (e.g., reader). We formalize 
aboutness in terms of the procedure ABOUT(σ), which 
produces the set of entities/objects that σ is “talking” about. In 
our case, we aim to reduce any self infon σ to σ´ such that 
ABOUT(σ) is PROP(σ´).  
Self atomic information represents information about the 
following:  
•  Aspects of proprietor (identification, character, acts, etc.) 
• His or her association with non-person “things” (e.g., house, 
dog, organization, etc.) 
• His or her relationships with other persons (e.g., Smith saw a 
blond woman). 
With regard to non-objects, of special importance for privacy 
analysis are aspects of persons that are expressed by sapinfon. 
Aspects of a person include his/her (physical) parts, character, 
acts, condition, name, health, race, handwriting, blood type, 
manner, and intelligence. The existence of these aspects 
depends on the person, in contrast to (physical or social) 
objects associated with him/her such as his/her house, dog, 
spouse, job, professional associations, etc.  
Let SAPII denote the set of sapinfons (self personal 
identifiable information). 
14. Aboutness proposition 
 σ ∈ SAPII ↔ ABOUT(σ) = PROP(σ)  
That is, atomic personal identifiable information σ is said to be 
self personal identifiable information (sapinfon) if its subject is 
its proprietor. The term “subject” here means what the entity is 
about when the information is communicated. The mechanism 
(e.g., manually) that converts APII to SAPII has yet to be 
investigated. 
A.  Sapinfons involving aspects of proprietor or relationship 
with non-person 
We further simplify sapinfons. Let OPJ(σ ∈ SAPII) be the 
set of objects in σ. SAPII is of two types depending on the 
number of objects embedded in it: singleton, ssapinfon and 
multitude, msapinfon. The set ssapinfons, SSAPII, is defined 
as:  
15.  Singleton proposition 
σ ∈ SSAPII → σ ∈ SAPII ∧ (PROP(σ) = OPJ(σ)) 
That is, the proprietor of σ is its only object.  
 
The set msapinfons, MSAPII, is defined as follows. 
16. Multitude proposition 
σ ∈ MSAPII → σ ∈ SAPII ∧ (|OPJ(σ)| > 1) 
That is, σ embeds other objects beside its proprietor.  
We also assume logical simplification that eliminates 
conjunctions and disjunctions of SAPII [5].  
Now we can declare that the sphere of personal identifiable 
information (piiSphere) for a given proprietor is the database 
that contains: 
1. All ssapinfons and msapinfons of the proprietor, including 
their arrangement in super-infons (e.g., to preserve compound 
personal identifiable information). 
2. Related non-identifiable information to the piiSphere of the 
proprietor, as discussed next. 
A.  What is related non-identifiable information? 
Consider the msapinfons Alice visited clinic Y. It is 
msapinfons because it represents a relationship (not an aspect 
of) the proprietor Alice had with an object, the clinic. 
Information about the clinic may or may not be privacy related 
information. For example, year of opening, number of beds, 
and other information about the clinic are not privacy related 
information; thus, such information ought not be included in 
Alice’s piiSphere. However, when the information is that the 
clinic is an abortion clinic, then Alice’s piiSphere ought to 
include this non-identifiable information about the clinic. 
As another example in terms of database tables, consider 
the following three tables representing the database of a 
company: 
Customer (Civil ID, Name, Address, Product ID) 
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Product (ID, Price, Factory)  
Factory (Product ID, Product location, Inventory) 
Customer’s piiSphere includes: 
- Ssapinfons (aspects of customer): Civil ID, Name 
- Msapinfons (relationships with non-person objects): 
Address, Product ID  
However, information about Factory is not information related 
to the customer’s piiSphere.  
Now suppose that we have the following database: 
Person (Name, Address, Place of work) 
Place of work (Name, Owner) 
If it is known that the owner of the place of work is the Mafia, 
then the information related to the person’s piiSphere extends 
beyond the name of place of work.  
The decision about the boundary between a certain 
piiSphere and its related non-identifiable information is 
difficult to formalize. Fig. 2 shows a conceptualization of 
piiSpheres of two proprietors that have compound PII. Dark 
circles A–G represent possible non-person objects. For 
example, object A participates in an msapinfon (e.g., Factory, 
Address, and Place of work in previous examples). Object A 
has its own aspects (white circle around A) and relationships 
(e.g., with F) where some information may be privacy-
significant to the piiSphere of proprietor. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Even the relationship between the two proprietors may have 
its own sphere of information (white circle around E). E 
signifies a connection among a set of apinfons (atomic PII) 
since we assume that all compound PII have been reduced to 
atomic PII. For example, the infon {Alice is the mother of a 
child in the orphanage, John is the child of a woman who gave 
him up} is a cpinfon with two apinfons. If Alice and John are 
the proprietors, then E in the figure preserves the connection 
between these two apinfons in the two piiSpheres of Alice and 
John. 
VI. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR PII DATABASES 
We concentrate on what we call PII database, PIIDB, that 
contains personal identifiable information and information 
related to it.  
A. Security requirement  
We can distinguish two types of information security:  
(1) Personal identifiable information security, and  
(2) Non-identifiable information security. 
While the security requirements of NII are concerned with the 
traditional system characteristics of confidentiality, integrity, 
and availability, PII security lends itself to unique techniques 
pertaining only to PII. 
The process of protecting PII involves (1) protection of the 
identities of the proprietor and (2) protection of the non-
identity portion of the PII. 
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Figure 2.  Conceptualization of piiSpheres of two proprietors.  
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Of course, all information security tools such as encryption 
can be applied in this context, yet other methods (e.g., 
anonymization) utilizing the unique structure of PII as a 
combination of identities and other information can also be 
used. Data-mining attacks on PII aim to determine the identity 
of the proprietor(s) from non-identifiable information; for 
example, determining the identity of a patient from 
anonymized information that gives age, sex, and zip code in 
health records (k-anonymization). Thus, PII lends itself to 
unique techniques that can be applied in protection of this 
information 
Another important issue that motivates organizing PII 
separately is that any intrusion on PII involves information in 
addition to the owner’s information (e.g., a company, 
proprietors, and other third parties, e.g., privacy 
commissioner). For example, a PII security system may 
require immediately alerting the proprietor that intrusion on 
his/her PII has occurred. 
An additional point is that the sensitivity of PII is in general 
valued more highly than the sensitivity of other types of 
information. PII is more “valuable” than non-PII because of its 
privacy aspect, as discussed previously. Such considerations 
imply a special security status for PII. The source of this 
volubility is instigated by moral considerations [7]. 
B. Policy requirement  
Some policies applied to PII are not applicable to NII (e.g., 
consent, opt-in/out, proprietor’s identity management, trust, 
privacy mining). While NII security requirements are 
concerned with the traditional system characteristics of 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability, PII privacy 
requirements are also concerned with such issues as purpose, 
privacy compliance, transborder flow of data, third party 
disclosure, etc. Separating PII from NII can reduce the 
complex policies required to safeguard sensitive information 
where multiple rules are applied, depending on who is 
accessing the data and what the function is. 
In general, PIIDB goes beyond mere protection of data:  
1. PIIDB identifies proprietor’s piiSphere and provides 
security, policy, and tools to the piiSphere. 
2. PIIDB provides security, policy, and tools only to 
proprietor’s piiSphere, thus conserving privacy efforts.  
2. PIIDB identifies inter-piiSphere relationships (proprietors’ 
relationships with each other) and provides security, policy, 
and tools to protect the privacy of these relationships. 
VII. PERSONAL IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION 
DATABASE (PIIDB) 
The central mechanism in PIIDB is an explicit declaration 
of proprietors in a table called PROPRIETORS that includes 
unique identifiers of all proprietors in the PIIDB. 
PROPRIETOR_TABLE contains a unique entry with an 
internal key (#proprietor) for each proprietor in addition to 
other information such as pointer(s) to his/her piiSphere.  
The principle of uniqueness of proprietor’s identifiers 
requires that the internal key (#proprietor) is mapped one-to-
one to the individual's legal identity or physical location. This 
is an important feature in PIIDB to guarantee consistency of 
information about persons. This “identity” uniquely identifies 
the piiSphere and distinguishes one piiSphere from another. 
Thus, if we have PIIDB of three individuals, then we have 
three entries such that each leads (denoted as ⇒) to three 
piiSpheres: 
PROPRIETOR_TABLE:  
{(#proprietor1, …) ⇒ piiSphere of proprietor 1, (#proprietor2, 
…) ⇒ piiSphere of proprietor 2, (#proprietor3, …) ⇒ 
piiSphere of proprietor 3}. 
The “…” denotes the possibility of other information in the 
table. What is the content of each piiSphere? The answer is 
set(s) of atomic PIIs and related information.  
Usually, database design begins by identifying data items, 
including objects and attributes (Employee No., Name, Salary, 
Birth, Date of Employment, etc.). Relationships among data 
items are then specified (e.g., data dependencies). 
Semantically oriented graphs (e.g., ER graphs [13]) are 
sometimes used at this level. Finally, a set of tables is 
declared, such as the following:  
T1 = Father (ID, Name, Details),  
T2 = Mother (ID, Name Details),  
T3 = Child (ID, Name, Details),  
T4 = Case (No., Father ID, Mother ID, Child ID). 
T1, T2, and T3 represent atomic PIIs of fathers, mothers, 
and children, respectively. T4 embeds compound PIIs. In 
PIIDB, if R is a compound PII, then it is represented by the set 
of atomic PIIs: 
{R′ = Case (No., Father ID),  
R′′ = Case (No., Mother ID),  
R′′ = Case (No., Child ID)} 
Where R′ is in the piiSphere of father, R′′ is in the piiSphere 
of mother, and R′′ is in the piiSphere of child. Such a schema 
permits complete isolation of atomic PIIs from each other. 
This privacy requirement is essential in many personal 
identifiable databases. For example, in orphanages it is 
possible not to allow access to the information that a record 
exists in the database for a mother. In the example above, 
access policy for the three piiSpheres is independent from 
each other. At the conceptual level, reconstructing the 
relations among proprietors (cpinfons) is a database design 
problem (e.g., internal pointers among tables across 
piiSpheres).  
PIIDB obeys all propositions defined previously. Some of 
these propositions can be utilized as privacy rules. As an 
illustration of the applications of these propositions, consider 
the case of privacy constraint that prohibits disclosing σ ∈ PII. 
By proposition (9) above, mixing (e.g., amending, inserting, 
etc.) σ with any other piece of information makes the 
disclosure constraint apply to the combined piece of 
information. In this case a general policy is: Applying a 
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protection rule to σ1 ∈ PII implies applying the same 
protection to (σ1
 
σ2) where σ2 ∉ PII. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
The theory of PII infons can provide a theoretical 
foundation for technical solutions to problems of protection of 
personal identifiable information. In such an approach, privacy 
rules form an integral part of the design of the system. PII can 
be identified (hence becomes an object of privacy rules) 
during processing of information that may mix it with other 
types of information. Different types of basic PII infons 
provide an opportunity for tuning the design of an information 
system. We propose analyzing and processing PII as a 
database with clear boundary lines separate from non-
identifiable information, which facilitates meeting the unique 
requirements of PII. A great deal of work is needed at the 
theoretical and design levels. An expanded version of this 
paper includes complete formalization of the theory. 
Additionally, we are currently applying the approach to 
analysis of an actual database of a government agency that 
handles social problems where a great deal of PII is collected. 
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